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THE SUPREME COURT OF TRE STATE OF UTAH

JOHN P. CONDAS, GEORGE P.
CONDAS, HARRY P. CONDAS,
'1ARGARITA CREGLOW ELLIS
and TESSIE MADSEN,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.
CASE NO. 15,669
GEORGE J. CONDAS, :1ARY
CONDAS LEK~ER, CHRIS J.
CONDAS, NICK J. CONDAS,
ELLEN CONDAS BAYAS,
ALEXA~DRA CG:'lDAS OCKEY and
J. CONDAS CORPORATION, a
Utah corporation,
Defendants and

Ap~ellants.

REPLY BRIEF OF

DEFE:JDA~TS-APPELLANTS

The Brief of Respondents fails to squarely address the
1ssues of admissibility in evidence of

portions of

a8s~~ac~ed

selected testimony from the Abstract of Record in the Sullivan
v. Condas case

(Salt

Court Case :io. 4922).

La~e

County Civil No.

~2140

-

Supreme

Likewise the Brief of Respondents

erroneously assumes that the

pleadi~gs

and Brief of John G.

Condas in the Sullivan v. Condas case are declarations against
interest and/or judic1al admissions and are binding on
appellants in this case.

Furthermore, the Brief of Respondents

wholly fails to address its burden of oroof by clear and
convincing e•.ridence that a r:Jublic roadway ·,.;as established over
appellants'

lands.
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The import of respondents' approach is to brush over
the inescapable conclusion that the competent evidence in
this case simply will not support the Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Decree of the court below.
the Brief of Respondents cannot go unchallenged.

Accordingly
In this

Reply Brief appellants will endeavor to address the more
serious deficiencies and will strive to avoid "nit-picking".
REPLY TO POiil'T I

The real problem with the testimony of the witnesses
who testified in the Sullivan v. Condas case is the form in
which it was offered in this case, ie. abstracted portions
of selected testimony from the Abstract of Record.

Respondent

glosses over these fatal deficiencies by relying on loss of
the transcript and suggesting that the circumstances under
which it was prepared argue forcibly for its accuracy.

Here

respondents' proof consisted of selected abstracted portions of
the testimony.

Yet the substance of the whole testimony on

the particular point or issue involved in the previous trial
including both testimony given on direct examination and testimony given on cross-examination must be proved, even though
the identical words need not be reproduced.

Annotation:

11 A.L.R. 2d 30, §32, p. 112; 29 Arn.Jur. 2d Evidence, §762
p. 832.

The reason for the rule is obvious since how else

could the trier of the fact or the court on appeal weigh and
Jive fair consideration

t~

the

test_mc~y

without knowi c

:h~

whole of the substance thereof given both on direct examinat1on
and cross-examination?
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For the reasons stated above and those in appellants'
primary brief which remain unanswered in respondents' brief,
it is respectfully submitted that it was error for the trial
court to receive into evidence the abstracted portions of
selected testimony and to base its findings thereon was
reversible error.
REPLY TO POINT II
Respondents wholly ignore the difference between a
"declaration against interest'' and an "admission" and loosely
use the terms interchangeably.

Likewise, respondents do not

distinguish between "admissions by parties" or "authorized
and adoptive admissions" or "vicarious admissions" and ,:q·ain
use the terms interchangeably.

Yet the rules applicable thereto

are different.
Suffice it to say the only statenents of John G. Condas
in the Sullivan v. Condas case which might be admissible in
this case are his declarations of fact against his interest
given in his testimony therein under the exception contained
in Rule 63(10), U.R.:::.

A careful reading of the abstracted

portion of his testimony reveals no statement or declaration
by him of a public roadway uo lfuite Pine Canyon through his

;:Jroperty.
The pleadings and brief of John G. Condas in the
Sullivan v. Condas case, even though authorized by him, are
ex c l u ci e d

f rom '\ u l

e

·)

3 ( 9 ) , C . :\ . - .

under the authority

c~:ed

in appellants' primar~· brr.ef and clearly do not fall l.;'ithin
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the exceptions contained in Rules 63(7) and 63(8), U.R.E.
Again, it was error for the trial court to receive the same
in evidence and it was reversible error for the trial court
to base its findings thereon.
REPLY TO POINT III
Respondents' whole argument under this point is
founded on the erroneous assumption that the decision of
the Intermediate Court of Appeals of Arizona in 11echam v.
City of Glendale, 489 P.2d 65, 15 Ariz. App. 402 (1971),
is the law in Utah.

There Mecham prevailed in the prior

litigation against his contract seller Owens in breach of
contract by relying on the validity of the city's abandonment
of the roadway.

In the subsequent litigation asainst the

city, Mecham was estopped from asserting invalidity of the
abandonment which had been decided in his favor in the
prior litigation.
In Richards v. Hodson, 26 Utah 2d 113, 485 P.2d 1044
(1971), which is the law in Utah, this court held that
collateral estoppel applies where issues which are actually
decided against a party in a prior action may be relied
upon by an opponent in a later case as having been judicially
established.

Furthermore, this court there emphasized that

the issue had to be decided against the party in the prlor
litigation and in so doing rejects the rationale of Mecham
v.

~ity

of

Glen~~le,

sup=a, as being

t~e

.aw in U:3.1.

Here

the court below adopted the rationale of Mecham v. Citv of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Gle~dale,

estoppel

s~~ra,
~8

reve~sible

I:-1

the

~or

as the basis
~acts

its application of collateral

of this case and in so doing committed

e~~~r.

:Zr.l~:-:t

305 ?.2d 503

·:. ?lat ':'op :1i:1ing Comi_)any, 6 Ctah 2d 51,

!l?S-:') cited on page 18 of respondents'

brief,

the issue of the validity of certain mining claims was
conclus::.·:el:; established by a judgment in a prior action
between locater's of certai:-1 conflicting mining claims and
this Court held that the Beehive claimants having had an
opportun1ty to defend their title to their claims in the
prior case and having failed to do so were precluded from
litigating the same issues i:-1 the instant case i:1sofar

'~

the rights of the same parties or their successors were
concerned.

Here the resi_)ondents \vere not parties to Sullivan

"!.Candas a:1d Kniqht •;.

Flat Top :-lining ::::.maar.•:,

supra,

simply does :10t apply.
In view of the foregoing,

the trial court erred in

its application of the Doctri:1e of Collateral Estoppel to
the facts of this case as the whole basis for its decision
and in so doing committed re•1ers1ble error.
REPLY TO

POI~T

IV

Respondents predicate their whole araument under this
point on the erroneous premise that the Sullivan v. Candas
case establlshed a publ1c roadway across aopellants'
while it was still a::;>~- of the oubl:; domain.

-

~

-

lands

The Findings
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and Decree in that case specifically and unequivocally limite~
the public road from the highway along Trottman's Lane and
across the lands of Sullivan with the center line specificall;
described to the gate on his South boundary.
Thus the language quoted from the opinion of this Court
in Sullivan v. Condas, 76 Utah 585, 290 Pac. 954

(1930), on

page 20 of respondents' brief is clearly obiter dictum since
the appeal there was taken from the Decree which only established a public road across the then Sullivan lands.

This is

made more clear by the language of this Court which followed
the above on the same page

(290 Pac. 957), to-wit:

l-Ie on the record are satisfied that the great
preponderance of the evidence supports the
findings that for fifty years prior to the
commencement of the action, the public generally,
the defendant and his predecessors in interest,
used and occupied the roadway to the extent of
one and one-half rods on each side of the center
thereof as it passed through the lands of the
plaintiffs and thelr predecessors ln lnterest,
openly, contlnuously, unlnteruptedly and under
claim of right, until wrongfully interfered '.-lith
by the plaintiffs shortly before the commencement
of the action, and used, treated, and regarded
the roadway as a public highway.
The roadway to
such extent was thus decreed to be a public
highway.
(underscoring ours)
On page 21 of respondents' brief the comment is made
that counsel for appellants never asked the trial court at
any time to consider anything from the Sullivan case which
was not already before it.

The facts are that appellants

repeatedly objected and moved to strike such evidence whlch
was received by the trial court subject to appellants' ~otion
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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live
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by appellants' witnesses and documentary evidence from 1922
until the present time.

And we note that respondents had

the burden of proving otherwise in the court below by clear
and convincing evidence which they wholly failed to do.
Accordingly, the Findings, Conclusions and Decree of the
trial court must be set aside and reversed.
REPLY TO POINT V
Respondents predicate their whole argument under this
point on the erroneous premise that a public road had been
established across appellants'
part of the public domain.

lands while the same were a

Sullivan v. Condas, supra, did

not so decide nor does the competent evidence in this case
so establish.

And since no public road has been so estab-

lished, the decision of the trial court relative to the
action of the Summit County Commissioners is moot.
While appellants have no quarrel with the principles
of law announced in Sullivan v. Condas, supra, as relating
to the Sullivan lands, those principles have no application
to appellants'

lands herein.

That is the legal reason

which has been repeatedly offered by appellants in this case
and which is repeatedly ignored by respondents.
REPLY TO POINT VI
Respondents complain on page 25 of their Brief that
the former testimony of deceased witnesses have been ~gnored.
Appellants make it abundantly clear Jn page 6 of

tle~r

brl2f

that the Statement of Facts contained therein is develooed
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to t~e excL:sio:: o: such evidence since it was inadmissible
~es?ondents

abst::::-acted testimony o: :::>el

then go on to quote selected

~edden

i:::. an attempt to pro?e a

point and :n so doing point up the very error which results
:'~:.1s

there:'::-om.

the abstracted testimony o: Delbert H.

Redden on page 100 thereo: next preceding respondents'

quote

states
·~ell, in all ~:! time there I never knew of
a wagon going :.lp half a m1le above my house, not
the kind, not a wagon, you understand, a :'our~hee~ed ~ago~,
I ~~ow of course * * * ''

A?pe!lants po:nt

ad:nissJ..jle or
e~ll

and

seek

~o

s~o'-.:l:::

~ischie~

co~~ound

s:Jeak :or

<::-.e::~se

s~ec·:...:la.:.e

:)n

the

:J~

t~a~

~p

beca~se

the above not

be considered but
recelvi~g

that

t:J

it is

,:.e::1c:1s:.rate :.:--.e

~indo~

evide~ce.

~~E

error on this a??eal.

l·.•e s and

·.·:l:.:::.:-: ::):

~

t

se r·:e s

:.~e

:10

use :'ul purpose to

trail sho'."""!1. :::-tereon or who or

To sa:_; as respondents do on
page 26 o: <:heir ::r:e: that the ho!Clestead doc•ments ·,;ere
not lntended to mean that no road existed in the canyon is
the rankest k1nd o: speculation.

~nd

to

s~ggest

that the

homestead papers o: Pete and ~us Condas were prepared by John
Condas and the::::-e:ore should be interpreted di:'ferentl:_; is
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while such lands were a part of the public domain or after
such lands became privately owned.

Respondents had the

burden of proving that issue by clear and convincing evidence.
Respondents apparently concede that they did not meet their
burden of proof after appellants' lands passed into private
ownership.

They labeled the post-turn of the century evidence

as irrelevant and rest their case on Sullivan v. Candas, supra,
as establishing a public road while appellants'
a part of the public domain.
must fail.

lands were

In so doing respondents'

case

It is just that simple.

Respondents allude to the testimony of the witness
David Street which is of 1950 vintage and is absolutely of
no help.

Suffice it to say the testimony of his superior

Don H. Peterson places it in proper perspective

(R.

879-885,

incl.).
While gates and signs do not destroy a public road
already lawfully established, gates and signs do prevent
a public road from thereafter being lawfully established
since such acts negative the requisite intention of the
landowner to abandon the roadway to the public use.
Demonstrative of the irreconcilable conflicts which
permeate the Findings of the trial court that "the public
continued to use the roadway until it was closed by defendants
in 1971"

(Fdg. 4) is its specific finding that John F. Candas

constructed "a wooden gate of only suffici2nt width tc
permit passage of a person riding horseback across the
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(Fdg. 9).
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this appeal.
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